CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927 — Page 192

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. January 1927.

SECRET.

756-B.

(Also Papers Nos. C.O.S. 59 and C.P. 4 (27).

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL Defence.

Copy No.

18

SITUATION IN CHINA, JANUARY 1927.

(Previous C.I.D. Papers Nos. 617–B, 677–B, 681–B, 722-B, 727-B and 750-B.)

Report by the Chiefs of Staff.

1. THE Chiefs of Staff Committee have been instructed by the Prime Minister to examine the situation in China in the light of recent events. For this purpose we held a meeting on the 11th January, 1927, which was attended by Mr. G. A. Mounsey, C.M.G., O.B.E., of the Foreign Office, and by Captain W. J. C. Lake, R.Ñ., who had recently returned from the China Station. As a starting point in our examination we have taken the Report which we submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 25th June, 1925 (C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B), the Conclusions of which have sufficient bearing on the present situation to deserve quotation in full :-

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*

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.

(a.) The military significance of the present unrest in China lies rather in the promise it gives of further and more serious disturbances in the future than in any present danger.

(b.) In the event of threats to or attacks on the Legation or other British interests in Pekin or Tientsin, no British military force other than the one battalion at Tientsin is available. The first reinforcement which could arrive would be one brigade from India; this could reach Taku in about five weeks from the date of the order to mobilise. During this period of five weeks reliance would have to be placed on international action.

"(c.) British interests in the Treaty ports are already receiving such protection as is possible from the naval forces in the Far East, and no protection can be provided other than by the naval forces, which we recommend should be increased.

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'(d.) British interests inland can receive no protection unless they are on the navigable rivers. Missionaries and isolated individuals, if threatened, should be withdrawn to the ports.

(e.) Modern gunboats should be provided for use on the rivers in China. "An increase in our military forces in the Far East is desirable, so that a small reserve may be available to meet emergencies such as the present. (In the body of the Report we suggested that the reinforcements should consist as a minimum of an additional British and an additional Indian battalion at Hong-Kong.)

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(g.) For the reasons given in the Joint Note circulated with this Report (see annexure*) offensive action in China on a large scale is not possible for the British Empire acting alone, and finality could not be hoped for from any operation within our capacity. Offensive action on a large scale can only be international, and even on that basis it would probably be unprofitable, except possibly for Japan, who must be the predominant partner."

[15645]

* Vide Annexure to C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B.

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